The Constitutional Right to Defense Experts by Giannelli, Paul C.
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Publications 
1993 
The Constitutional Right to Defense Experts 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Case Western University School of Law, paul.giannelli@case.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Giannelli, Paul C., "The Constitutional Right to Defense Experts" (1993). Faculty Publications. 311. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/311 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
I 
ifol. 16, No. 3 
I\ . 
KFO 
578 
.All5 
P82 
c.l 
Summer 1993 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DEFENSE EXPERTS 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead 1/J & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western ReseNe University 
In many criminal cases, securing the services of (1981), had ruled that an indigent defendant in a paternity 
experts to examine evidence, to advise counsel, and to action, a "quasi-criminal" proceeding, had the right to a 
testify at trial is critical. As the ABA Standards note: "The blood grouping test at state expense. 
quality of representation at trial ... may be excellent and Nevertheless, some courts continued to refuse to 
yet valueless to the defendant if his defense requires the recognize a right to expert assistance in criminal cases. 
assistance of a psychiatrist or handwriting expert and no For example, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded: 
such services are available." ABA Standards Relating to "Neither the United States Constitution nor the Mississippi 
Providing Defense Services 5-1.4 (2d ed. 1980). Constitution requires that the Nation or State furnish an 
As early as 1929, Justice Cardozo commented: "[U]pon indigent defendant with the assistance of a psychiatrist. 
the trial of certain issues, such as insanity or forgery, The only assistance that they require is the assistance of 
experts are often necessary both for the prosecution and legal counsel." Phillips v. State, 197 So. 2d 241,244 
for defense .... (A] defendant may be at an unfair disad- (Miss. 1967), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 1050 (1968). In 1985, 
vantage, if he is unable because of poverty to parry by his however, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized, for the first 
own witnesses the thrusts of those against him." Reilly v. time, a due process right to expert assistance; that case 
Berry, 250 N.Y. 456, 461, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (1929). was Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
SMITH v. BALDI 
Prior to 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court had considered 
an indigent's right to expert services only once. In United 
States ex rei. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953), a murder 
defendant argued that "the assistance of a psychiatrist 
was necessary to afford him adequate counsel" in the 
presentation of his insanity defense and thus, the state 
was obligated to provide such assistance./d. at 568. In 
rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court stated, "We 
cannot say that the State has that duty by constitutional 
mandate." /d. 
Smith, however, was not a convincing precedent. First, 
it could easily be distinguished on the facts. Two defense 
psychiatrists had examined Smith, and consequently the 
Supreme Court's opinion could be read as rejecting only 
a right to additional experts. See Bush v. McCollum, 231 
F. Supp. 560, 564 (N.D. Tex. 1964) (court distinguished 
Smith because two defense psychiatrists had testified in 
that case), aff'd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965). 
More importantly, Smith was decided in 1953, and its 
continued vitality after the Warren Court's revolution in 
criminal procedure during the 1960s seemed suspect. 
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit had noted that the "Baldi deci-
sion ... was severely undercut by the Court's decision in 
Griffin v. Illinois." Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383, 
1391 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979). By 
1981, the Supreme Court, in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 
ublic Defender Hyman Friedman 
AKE v. OKLAHOMA 
Ake was charged with capital murder. At arraignment, 
his conduct was "so bizarre" that the trial judge ordered, 
sua sponte, a mental evaluation. Ake was found 
incompetent to stand trial but later recovered due to 
antipsychotic drugs. When the prosecution resumed, 
Ake's attorney requested a psychiatric evaluation at state 
expense to prepare an insanity defense. 
Citing Smith, the trial court refused. Thus, although 
insanity was the only contested issue at trial, no 
psychiatrists testified on this issue, and Ake was convict-
ed. In seeking the death penalty, the prosecution relied 
on state psychiatrists, who testified that Ake was 
"dangerous to society." This testimony stood unrebutted 
because Akecould not afford an expert. On review, the 
Supreme Court overturned Ake's conviction. 
The Court addressed the precedential value of Smith. 
Since defense psychiatrists had testified in Smith, the 
Court held that Smith did not stand for the broad proposi-
tion that there was no constitutional right to a psychiatric 
examination, but at most, stood for "the proposition that 
there is no constitutional right to more psychiatric assist-
ance than the defendant in Smith had received." /d. at 85. 
More importantly, the Court recognized that Smith had 
been decided "at a time when indigent defendants in 
state courts had no constitutional right to even the pres-
ence of counsel." /d. Thus, according to the Court, Smith 
Telephone (216) 443-7223 
uyahoga County Public Defender Office, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
he views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Public Defender. 
opyright © 1993 Paul Giannelli 
did not preclude consideration of "whether fundamental 
fairness today requires a different result." /d. 
The Court began its analysis bycommenting: "[W]hen 
a State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent 
defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to 
assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to pres-
ent his defense." /d. at 76. This fair opportunity mandates 
that an accused be provided with the "basic tools of an 
adequate defense." /d. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 
404 u.s. 226 (1971)). 
The Court's due process analysis relied on a three-
pronged test derived from Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319 (1976): . 
Three factors are relevant to this determination. The 
first is the private interest that will be affected by the 
action of the State. The second is the governmental 
interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be 
provided. The third is the probable value of the addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards that are 
sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the 
affected interest if those safeguards are not provided. 
470 U.S. at 77. 
Applying these factors, the Court found that a defen-
dant's interest in the accuracy of a criminal trial that 
placed his life or liberty at risk "is almost uniquely 
compelling." /d. at 78. In contrast, the state's only interest 
is economic. Although the state claimed that the cost of 
providing expert assistance would result in "a staggering 
burden to the State," the Court dismissed this argument, 
pointing out (1) that many other jurisdictions provided 
psychiatric assistance to indigent defendants and (2) that 
its holding was limited to "one competent psychiatrist." 
/d. at '79, finally, the Court considered the probable value 
of the assistance sought and the risk of error if it was not 
provided. The Court concluded that the need for expert 
assistance was criticaland the risk of error "extremely 
high" if assistance is not provided. /d. at 82. In sum, the 
Court wrote: 
We hold that when a defendant has made a prelimi-
nary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense 
is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution 
requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's 
assistance on this issue, if the defendant cannot other-
wise afford one.ld. at 74. 
The facts met this standard: (1)Ake's only defense was 
insanity. (2) His bizarre behavior at the arraignment, just 
four months after the crime, prompted the trial court to 
order, sua sponte, a mental examination. (3) A state 
psychiatrist declared Ake incompetent to stand trial. (4) 
He was found competent six weeks later only if he stayed 
on Thorazine, an antipsychotic drug. (5) The state's 
psychiatric testimony acknowledged the severity of Ake's 
mental illness and possibly that it "might have begun 
many years earlier." /d. at 86. (6) The burden of producing 
evidence of insanity rested, under state law, with the 
defendant. In a footnote, however, the Court commented: 
"We express no opinion as to whether any of these 
factors, alone or in combination, is necessary to make 
this finding." /d. at 86 n. 12. 
While the Ake decision settled the core issue by recog-
nizing a right to expert assistance, it left a number of 
important issues unresolved. These issues are 
discussed in the following sections. 
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NONCAPITAL CASES 
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger empha-
sized that Ake involved a capital case: "The facts of the 
case and the question presented confine the actual hold-
ing of the Court. In capital cases the finality of the 
sentence imposed warrants protections that may or may 
not be required in other cases." /d. at 87. Some courts 
have accepted this limitation, one writing that "Ake does 
not reach noncapital cases." lsom v. State, 488 So. 2d 12, 
13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). Accord McCord v. State, 507 
So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987). 
Although Ake involved a capital defendant, nothing in 
the majority opinion suggested that the newly-recognized 
right to expert as.sistance was limited to death penalty 
cases. Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, implicitly 
acknowledged that the majority opinion was not so limited. 
He criticized the majority because "the constitutional 
rule announced by the Court is far too broad. I would limit 
the rule to capital cases." 470 U.S. at 87. 
Most courts assume that Ake applies to noncapital 
cases. As the Eighth Circuit has noted, "Nor do we draw 
a decisive line for due-process purposes between capital 
and noncapital cases." Little v. Armantrout, 835 F.2d 
1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987)(en bane) (error to fail to appoint 
hypnotist), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988). See also 
Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d 640, 643 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(prison term imposed). 
NONPSYCHIATRIC EXPERTS 
Ake involved psychiatric experts in an insanity case, 
and although the importance of expert testimony in this 
type of trial played a critical role in the decision, the 
Court's rationale extends to prosecutions involving other 
types of experts. Indeed, the Court not only held that Ake 
had the rightto expert assistance on the insanity defense 
but also on the ''future dangerousness" issue raised in 
the penalty stage: "[D]ue process requires access to a 
psychiatric examination on relevant issues, to the 
testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in 
preparation at the sentencing phase." 470 U.S. at 84. 
Moreover, in a later case, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 
U.S. 320, 323 n. 1 (1985), the Court declined to consider a 
trial court's refusal to appoint fingerprint and ballistics 
experts because the defendant had not made a sufficient 
showing of need. The Court, however, gave no indication 
that fingerprint or ballistic experts were beyond the 
scope of Ake. 
Lower Court Disagreements 
Nevertheless, the cases disagree. For example, the 
Alabama Supreme Court rejected a defense request for 
the appointment of a forensic pathologist by noting that 
"there is nothing contained in the Ake decision to 
suggest that the United States Supreme Court was 
addressing anything other than psychiatrists and the 
insanity defense." Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 82 
(Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985). Similarly, in 
Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986), the court, in rejecting 
a request for a bloodstain expert, distinguished insanity 
cases: 
[The] risk [of an erroneous result] in other areas of 
scientific evidence is not necessarily present because 
the scientific expert is often able to explain to the jury 
how a conclusion was reached, the defense counsel 
can attack that conclusion, and the jury can then decide 
whether the conclusion had a sound basis./d. at 839. 
Accord Stafford v. Love, 726 P.2d 894, 896 (Okla. 1986). 
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit has ruled that "[t]here is 
no principled way to distinguish between psychiatric and 
non psychiatric experts. The question in each case must 
be not what field of science or expert knowledge is 
involved, but rather how important the scientific issue is 
in the case, and how much help a defense expert could 
have given." Little v. Armantrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 
(8th Cir. 1987} (en bane} (error to fail to appoint hypnotist}, 
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988}. 
Other cases have recognized a right to assistance 
outside the insanity context, including: 
fingerprint experts, State v. Bridges, 325 N.C. 529, 
533-34, 385 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1989}; State v. Moore, 321 
N.C. 327, 343-45, 364 S.E.2d 648, 656-57 (1988). 
hypnotists, Little v. Armantrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 
(8th Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988}. 
serologists, State v. Carmouche, 527 So. 2d 307 (La. 
1988). 
psychologists on the "battered wife syndrome," Dunn 
v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 314 (10th Cir. 1992). 
bite mark expert, Thornton v. State, 255 Ga. 434, 435, 
339 S.E.2d 240, 241 (1986); . 
intoxication expert, State v. Coker, 412 N.W.2d 589, 590 
(Iowa 1987). 
NEUTRAl OR PARTISAN EXPERTS 
Ake fails to specify clearly the role of the expert-
whether the appointment of a neutral expert, who reports 
to the court, satisfies due process, or whether a partisan 
defense expert is required. At one point in the opinion the 
Court stated that the defendant had the right to "one 
competent psychiatrist" when insanity is raised. 470 U.S. 
at 79. It also held that this right did not include the "right 
to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to 
receive funds to hire his own." /d. at 83. 
Neither of these passages, however, is conclusive, and 
other passages point toward a partisan role. According to 
the Court, the accused is guaranteed "access to a 
competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate 
examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and 
presentation of the defense." /d. This expert would 
"conduct a professional examination on issues relevant 
to the defense, to help determine whether the insanity 
defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in 
preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric 
witnesses." /d. at 82. 
lower Court Disagreements 
The lower courts split on this issue. The Fifth Circuit 
has ruled that a "court-appointed psychiatrist, whose 
opinion and testimony is available to both sides, satisfies 
[the accused's] rights." Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d 
185, 191 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The state is not required to 
permit defendants to shop around for a favorable 
expert ... He has no right to the appointment of a 
psychiatrist who will reach biased or only favorable 
conclusions"}, cert. denied, 495 U.S. 963 (1990}. 
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit rejected that view: 
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That duty [to appoint a psychiatrist] cannot be satisfied 
with the appointment of an expert who ultimately testi-
fies contrary to the defense on the issue of compe-
tence. The essential benefit of having an expert in the 
first place is denied the defendant when the services of 
the doctor must be shared with the prosecution. In this 
case, the benefit sought was not only the testimony of 
a psychiatrist to present the defendant's side of the 
case, but also the assistance of an expert to interpret 
the findings of an expert witness and to aid in the 
preparation of his cross-examination. Without that 
assistance, the defendant was deprived of the fair trial 
due process demands. United States v. Sloan, 776 
F.2d 926, 929 (10th Cir. 1985). 
Accord Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1992); 
Lilies v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 340 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 956 (1992); United States v. Austin, 933 
F.2d 833, 841 (10th Cir. 1991). 
Other decisions support this view. The Ninth Circuit 
has commented: 
The right to psychiatric assistance does not mean the 
right to place the report of a "neutral" psychiatrist 
before the court; rather it means the right to use the 
services of a psychiatrist in whatever capacity defense 
counsel deems appropriate- including to decide, 
with the psychiatrist's assistance, not to present to the 
court particular claims of mental impairment. Smith v. 
McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Accord Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d 640, 643 (11th Cir. 
1991); Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1312-13 (N.D. 
Ga. 1989) ("Ake contemplates a psychiatrist who will 
work closely with the defense by conducting an indepen-
dent examination, testifying if necessary, and preparing 
for the sentencing phase of the trial"), aff'd, 908 F.2d 695 
(11th Cir. 1990). 
THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT 
The defendant has the burden of establishing the need 
for expert assistance. According to Ake, the accused 
must make a "preliminary showing" that an issue requir-
ing expert assistance is "likely to be a significant factor at 
trial." 470 U.S. at 74. In a later case, Caldwell v. Mississip-
pi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), the Court declined to consider a 
trial court's refusal to appoint fingerprint and "ballistics" 
experts because the defendant had "offered little more 
than undeveloped assertions that the requested 
assistance would be beneficial." /d. at 323 n.1. 
Nevertheless, the precise dimensions of this threshold 
showing are not clear. As one court has noted, "the Ake 
decision fails to establish a bright line test for determin-
ing when a defendant has demonstrated that sanity at 
the time of the offense will be a significant factor at the 
time of trial." Volson v. Blackburn, 794 F.2d 173, 176 (5th 
Cir. 1986). 
The Eleventh Circuit has imposed a demanding 
threshold requirement. According to that court: 
Ake and Caldwell, taken together, hold that a defen-
dant must demonstrate something more than a mere 
possibility of assistance from a requested expert; due 
process does not require the government automatically 
to provide indigent defendants with expert assistance 
upon demand. Rather, a fair reading of these precedents 
is that a defendant must show the trial court that there 
exists a reasonable probability both that an expert 
would be of assistance to the defense and that denial 
of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally 
unfair trial. Thus, if a defendant wants an expert to 
assist his attorney in confronting the prosecution's 
proof- by preparing counsel to cross-examine the 
prosecution's experts or by providing rebuttal testimo-
ny- he must inform the court of the nature of the 
prosecution's case and how the requested expert 
would be useful. At the very least, he must inform the 
trial court about the nature of the crime and the 
evidence linking him to the crime. By the same token, 
if the defendant desires the appointment of an expert 
so that he can present an affirmative defense, such as 
insanity, he must demonstrate a substantial basis for 
the defense, as the defendant did in Ake. In each 
instance, the defendant's showing must also include a 
specific description of the expert or experts desired; 
without this basic information, the court would be 
unable to grant the defendant's motion, because the 
court would not know what type of expert was needed. 
In addition, the defendant should inform the court why 
the particular expert is necessary. Moore v. Kemp, 809 
F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 481 
u.s. 1054 (1987). 
The main problem with the rebuttal situation referred 
to in this quotation is the lack of adequate defense 
discovery. The court acknowledged this problem in a 
footnote: "In a jurisdiction still employing 'trial by 
ambush,' the defendant might have to ask the court to 
make the prosecutor disclose the theory of his case and 
theresults of any tests that may have been performed by 
government experts or at the government's request." /d. 
at 712 n. 10. For a discussion of discovery issues, see 
Giannelli, "Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and 
DNA," 44 Vand. L. Rev. 791 (1991). 
Several courts have explained the standard as follows: 
"[T]he defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that an expert would aid in his defense, and that denial of 
expert assistance would result in an unfair trial." Little v. 
Armantrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988). Others require the 
defendant to show a "clear and genuine" issue, "one that 
constitutes a 'close' question which may well be decided 
one way or the other. It must be one that is fairly debata-
ble or in doubt." Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 
1211 (10th Cir. 1986). 
If the threshold standard is too high, the defendant is 
placed in a "Catch-22" situation, in which the standard 
"demand[s] that the defendant possess already the 
expertise of the witness sought." State v. Moore, 321 N.C. 
327, 345,364 S.E.2d 648, 657 (1988). See also Harris, 
''Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain 
Beyond the Reach For The Indigent," 68 N.C. L. Rev. 763 
(1990) (arguing lower courts are setting the threshold 
requirement too high and thus not providing the partisan 
expert required by Ake). 
Motion for Appointment 
According to two commentators, a motion for the 
appointment of an expert should include: 
(1) The type of expert necessary; 
(2) The assistance the expert will provide to the defense; 
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(3) The name, qualifications, fees, etc. of the 
desired expert; 
(4) The reasonableness of the expert's fees and 
other costs; 
(5) The objective bases for the request (specific 
factual reasons for why an expert is necessary); 
(6) The subjective bases for the request (personal 
observations of your client such as possible 
emotional problems or drug addiction, etc. about 
which you wish to have an expert testify); 
(7) The legal necessity for the expert's testimony, 
i.e., what element will it attack; 
(8) The legal entitlement to an independent expert; 
and, 
(9) The inadequacy of available government 
experts. 
Hollander & Baldwin, "Expert Testimony in Criminal 
Trials: Creative Uses, Creative Attacks," 15 Champion 6, 
12 (Dec. 1991). 
RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE EXPERT 
Several defendants have argued that Ake includes the 
right to effective expert assistance. Indeed, the Court in 
Ake did refer to the right to "one competent psychiatrist." 
Nevertheless, the lower courts have rejected this argu-
ment. According to the Fourth Circuit: "To inaugurate a 
c~nstitutional or procedural rule of an ineffective expert 
w1tness in lieu of the constitutional standard of an 
ineffective attorney ... is going further than the federal 
procedural demands of a fair trial and the constitution 
require." ':"'aye v. Murray, 884 F.2d 765, 767 (4th Cir.), 
cert. demed, 492 U.S. 936 (1989). 
The Seventh Circuit objected that such a rule would 
require the federal courts "to engage in a form of 
'psychiatric medical malpractice' review." Silagy v. 
Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1013 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
111 u.s. 1024 (1991). 
The Ninth Circuit also declined to become enmeshed 
in such "a psycho-legal quagmire." Harris v. Vasquez, 
943 F.2d 930, 951 (9th Cir. 1991). 
RELATED ISSUES 
A number of other issues are raised by Ake. Several 
are discussed below. 
Ex Parte Procedure 
First, there is a procedural issue, which turns on which 
view of the expert's role is adopted. If the accused has a 
right to a partisan expert, then the proceedings seeking 
appointment should be ex parte, as they are under the 
Criminal Justice Act. 18 U.S.C. 3006(A)(e) (1985). The Ake 
decision does not explicitly address this issue, although 
at one point the Court spoke of an "ex parte threshold 
showing." 470 U.S. at 82. 
Moreover, several courts have ruled that an application 
for appointment of an expert should be considered in an 
ex parte hearing: "[l]n making the requisite showing 
defendant could be placed in a position of revealing his 
theory of the case. He therefore has a legitimate interest 
in making that showing ex parte." Brooks v. State, 259 
Ga. 562, 566,385 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1989), cert. denied, 494 
U.S. 1018 (1990). Accord MacGregor v. State, 733 P.2d 
416 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987). 
Victim Examinations 
A second issue concerns whether the right to an 
expert extends to a right to require an alleged victim to be 
examined by such an expert. This issue arises in cases 
in which the prosecution intends to offer evidence of 
"rape trauma syndrome" or "child sexual abuse accom-
modation syndrome." For example, the Nevada Supreme 
Court has held that "it is error to deny a defendant the 
assistance of a defense psychologist or psychiatrist to 
examine the child-victim and testify at trial when the 
State is provided such assistance." Lickey v. State, 827 
P.2d 824, 826 (1992). 
Prosecution Monopoly 
Finally, one case involved expert assistance in a field 
where the prosecution had a monopoly. In People v. 
Evans, 141 Misc. 2d 781, 534 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 
1988), the court ordered the N.Y.C. Police Department's 
Auto Crime Division to assign an experienced officer to 
assist the defense in inspecting vehicles: "Where the 
government holds a monopoly of expertise on a matter 
that reasonably bears on a defense in a criminal action, 
due process requires that a defendant be afforded 
access to this expertise." /d. at 783. 
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Prior to Ake, a number of courts had recognized a 
constitutional right to expert assistance. However, they 
had disagreed on the constitutional basis for this right. 
The right to effective assistance of counsel, equal protec-
tion, due process, and compulsory process had all been 
relied upon. Because the Supreme Court in Ake rested 
its decision on due process grounds, it did not consider 
these alternative grounds: "Because we conclude that 
the Due Process Clause guaranteed to Ake the 
assistance he requested and was denied, we have no 
occasion to consider the applicability of the Equal 
Protection Clause, or the Sixth Amendment, in this 
context." 470 U.S. at 87 n. 13. 
These additional constitutional bases are discussed 
below. 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the 
Supreme Court held the sixth amendment right to counsel 
applicable to the states. Accordingly, the state must 
provide counsel to indigent defendants. The Court noted: 
"[l]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person 
hailed into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot 
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for 
him." /d. at 344. Moreover, the right to counsel includes 
the right to effective assistance of counsel. See Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45, 71 (1932). 
Failure to Seek Expert Assistance 
Several courts have found ineffective assistance 
Nhere defense counsel has failed to obtain the services 
Jf expert witnesses: "The failure of defense counsel to 
3eek such assistance when the need is apparent 
jeprives an accused of adequate representation in viola-
:ion of his sixth amendment right to counsel." Proffitt v. 
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United States, 582 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980). 
Accord Wood v. Zahradnick, 578 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 
1978); United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275, 1279 (5th 
Cir. 1976) ("[W]hen an insanity defense is appropriate 
and the defendant lacks funds to secure private psychiatric 
assistance, it is the duty of his attorney to seek such 
assistance through the use of [the Criminal Justice 
Act]"); United States v. Fratus, 530 F.2d 644, 649-50 (5th 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976); United 
States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1164 (5th Cir. 1974); 
Owsley v. Peyton, 368 F.2d 1002, 1003 (4th Cir. 1966); 
Loe v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 662,672 (E. D. Va. 
1982) (counsel ineffective for failing to request a partisan 
expert under C.J.A.); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 
163-64, 599 P.2d 587, 598-600, 158 Ca!. Rptr. 281, 292-93 
(1979); Moore v. State, 827 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Mo. 1992) 
(counsel ineffective for failing to request serological test). 
Right to Expert Assistance 
If failure to secure expert assistance may constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel, then it is but a short 
step to recognizing that the sixth amendment places an 
affirmative duty upon the state to provide expert services 
to indigent defendants. See Lickey v. State, 827 P.2d 824, 
826 (Nev. 1992) ("If failure to request a psychological 
examination constitutes grounds for a finding of ineffec-
tive counsel, it logically follows that a defendant facing 
charges of sexual assault of a minor should be afforded 
an expert psychiatric witness"). 
A number of courts have adopted this view: "[T]he 
right to counsel is meaningless if the lawyer is unable to 
make an effective defense because he has no funds to 
provide the specialized testimony which the case 
requires." Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560, 565 (N.D. 
Tex. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965). See also 
Matlock v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1236, 1243-44 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Brinks v. Alabama, 465 F.2d 446, 449 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1979); Hintz v. Beta, 379 F.2d 937, 
941 (5th Cir. 1967) ("effective assistance of counsel ... 
may necessitate a psychiatric examination of a defen-
dant"); Greer v. Beta, 379 F.2d 923,925 (5th Cir. 1967) 
(state policy of not providing psychiatric experts for 
defense "may not ... avoid the federal constitutional 
right to the effective assistance of counsel"); Corenevsky 
v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 307, 319, 682 P.2d 360, 367, 
204 Cal. Rptr. 165, 172 (1984) (right to counsel "includes 
the right to reasonably necessary ancillary defense serv-
ices"); In re Ketchel, 68 Cal. 2d 397, 399, 438 P.2d 625, 
627, 66 Cal. Rptr. 881, 883 (1968); Taylor v. Superior 
Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1217, 1218, 215 Cal. Rptr. 73, 74 
(1985) (fingerprint expert); People v. Worthy, 109 Cal. 
App. 3d 514, 518-19, 167 Cal. Rptr. 402, 404-05 (1980); 
English v. Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292, 393 (Iowa 1981); 
State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1262-63 (Me. 1983); State 
v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399,416, 217 A.2d 441, 450 (1966); State 
v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 241, 243-44, 453 
P. 2d 421,422-23 (1969); State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 66, 
277 S.E.2d 410, 418 (1981); State v. Dickamore, 22 Wash. 
App. 851, 854,592 P.2d 681,683 (1979). 
A leading case is Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th 
Cir. 1980), in which an indigent murder defendant 
requested the appointment of an independent forensic 
pathologist to determine the victim's cause of death. The 
request was denied by the state trial court. In granting 
habeas relief, the Fourth Circuit based its decision on the 
equal protection guarantee and the right to counsel: 
"There can be no doubt that an effective defense some-
times requires the assistance of an expert witness." /d. at 
1025. Under this theory, an expert should be appointed 
whenever necessary for counsel to render effective 
assistance; that is, "whenever the [expert] services are 
'necessary to the preparation and presentation of an 
adequate defense.' " Proffitt v. United States, 582 F.2d 
854, 857 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980). 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
The equal protection argument for the appointment of 
defense experts has its genesis in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12 (1956), in which an indigent defendant challenged 
a state practice of co_nditioning appellate review upon the 
availability of a transcript that the defendant could not 
afford. The Supreme Court held that failure to provide a 
free transcript denied the accused due process and 
equal protection. According to the Court, "There can be 
no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets 
depends on the amount of money he has." /d. at 19 
(plurality opinion). 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court 
extended the "Griffin principle" to the appointment of 
counsel for a first appeal as of right. Other cases also 
echoed this principle: "Griffin v. Illinois and its progeny 
established the principle that the State must, as a matter 
of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the 
basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when 
those tools are available for a pric_eto other prisoners." 
Brlttv.Narth-Carollna, 404 u.s. 226, 227 (1971). See also 
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) ("Our deci-
sions for more than a decade novihave made clear that 
differences in access to the instruments needed to vindi-
cate legal rights, when based upon the financial situation 
of the defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution"). 
Several courts have relied on this line of cases when 
recognizing an indigent's right to expert assistance. For 
example, one court wrote: 
It is obvious that only [the defendant's] inability to pay 
for the services of a psychiatrist prevented a proper 
presentation of his case. The Supreme Court has 
unmistakably held that in criminal proceedings it will 
not tolerate discrimination between indigents and 
thosewho possess the means to protect their rights." 
Jacobs v. United States, 350 F.2d 571, 573 (4th Cir. 1965). 
Accord Bradford v. United States, 413 F.2d 467, 474 (5th 
Cir. 1969); People v. Gunnerson, 74 Cal. App. 3d 370, 379, 
141 Cal. Rptr. 488,494 (1977); Pierce v. State, 251 Ga. 
590, 592-93,308 S.E.2d 367,368-69 (1983); State v. Olin, 
103ldaho391, 394, 648 P.2d 203,206 (1982); State v. 
Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1262-63 (Me. 1983). 
Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980), which 
was discussed in the preceding section, is a leading 
case. Martin, an indigent, requested the services of a 
forensic pathologist to evaluate the victim's cause of 
death in a homicide prosecution. The Fourth Circuit held 
that the trial court's refusal to appoint an expert "denied 
[the defendant] equal protection of the law." /d. at 1027. 
According to the court, the standard for determining 
whether expert assistance is constitutionally required is 
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"(a) whether a substantial question requiring expert 
testimony arose over the cause of death, and (b) whether 
Williams' defense could be fully developed without 
professional assistance." /d. at 1026. The court's exami-
nation of the record revealed that a substantial question 
about the cause of death had existed and that the 
absence of an expert witness hampered the development 
of this defense. Significantly, the court held that "[i]t is 
not incumbent upon Williams to prove ... that an inde-
pendent expert would have provided helpful testimony at 
trial. An indigent prisoner ... should not be required to 
present proof of what an expert would say when he is 
denied access to an expert." /d. at 1026-27. 
later Supreme Court Cases 
The principal problem with this line of analysis is the 
Supreme Court's later cases-in particular, Ross v. 
Moffitt, 417-U.S. 600 (1974), which undercuts the Griffin-
Douglas rationale. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law 1119 (1988) (Douglas "effectively sterilized" in Ross). 
Ross involved the appointment of counsel for discre-
tionary appeals. The Court held that a state practice not 
to appoint counsel in such cases satisfied the equal 
protection guarantee. According to the Court, the equal 
protection clause " 'does not require absolute equality or 
precisely equal advantages.' "417 U.S. at 612 (quoting 
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 24 (1973)). Although the Court recognized the 
disadvantage an indigent suffered in comparison with a 
non indigent in this context, it held that the 
duty of the State ... is not to duplicate the legal 
arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal 
defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his convic-
tion, but only to assure the indigent defendant an 
adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the 
context of the State's appellate process./d. at 616. 
Thus, the focus of the Court's analysis was not the 
disparity between indigent and non indigent, but whether 
the indigent had an "adequate opportunity" to present 
his case. 
'This approach smacks more of a due process rather 
than an equal protection analysis. See Kamisar, "Poverty, 
Equality and Criminal Procedure: From Griffin v. Illinois 
and Douglas v. California to Ross v. Moffitt," in National 
College of District Attorneys, Constitutional Law Deskbook 
1-79, 1-101 (3d ed. 1978). In a later case, the Court noted 
that "[d]ue process and equal protection principles 
converge in the Court's analysis in these cases." 
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983). In Ross, 
the Court pointed ollt that equal protection analysis 
"emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between 
classes of individuals whose situations are arguably 
indistinguishable," whereas due process analysis 
"emphasizes fairness between the State and the 
individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other 
individuals in the same situation may be treated." 417 
U.S. at 609. See also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405 
(1985); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983). 
Ross weakens the equal protection argument for 
expert assistance, and a number of courts have cited 
Ross in upholding denials of requests for expert 
assistance. Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. 725, 736 (D. 
Md. 1977); State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 66, 277 S.E.2d 
410, 418 (1981); State v. Gray, 292 N.C. 270, 277-78, 233 
S.E.2d 905,911 (1977); Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531, 
535 (Tenn. 1977). Nevertheless, it does not completely 
undercut it. Without an expert witness, an indigent may 
not have an "adequate opportunity" to present a defense. 
This standard, however, is similar, if not identical, to the 
Court's due process analysis in Ake. 
COMPULSORY PROCESS 
In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), the 
Supreme Court held that the compulsory process clause 
applied in state trials: Moreover, the Court adopted a 
liberal view of the clause; it was not limited to the right to 
subpoena witnesses but also included the right to pres-
ent defense evidence: 
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to 
compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms 
the right to present a defense, the right to present the 
defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecu-
tion's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. 
/d. at 19. 
See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) 
("To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the 
function of courts that compulsory process be available 
for the production of evidence needed either by the 
prosecution or by the defense"). 
Although Washington did not involve expert witnesses, 
"it is scarcely conceivable that defendants could be 
constitutionally denied the opportunity to call experts to 
give opinion evidence about such matters as fingerprints, 
bloodstains, sanity, and other matters that routinely arise 
~.'~;,;;. in criminal litigation." Westen, "Compulsory Process II," 
i 74 Mich. L. Rev. 192,203 (1975). 
A number of courts have based a defendant's right to 
expert testimony on the compulsory process guarantee. 
In Flores v. Estelle, 492 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1974), for exam-
ple, the defendant attempted to elicit expert opinion 
testimony from a state toxicologist who had been 
subpoenaed by the defense. The expert refused to 
express an opinion because he had not been retained as 
an expert witness, and the trial court declined to require 
him to testify. The reviewing courts agreed "that the trial 
court erred in refusing to require [the expert] to testify, 
1 thereby depriving Flores of effective compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor." /d. at 712. See also 
English v. Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292 (Iowa 1981); State v. 
Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 31, 369 N .E.2d 24 (C.P. 1977). 
Similarly, in People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 
N.E.2d 645 (1966), an indigent forgery defendant 
requested the appointment of a handwriting expert. The 
Illinois Supreme Court held that the refusal to appoint the 
expert violated the compulsory process guarantee: 
The court recognizes that there is a distinction 
between the right to call witnesses and the right to 
have these witnesses paid for by the government, but 
in certain instances involving indigents, the lack of 
funds with which to pay for the witness will often 
preclude him from calling that witness and occasionally 
prevent him from offering a defense. Thus, although 
the defendant is afforded the shadow of the right to call 
witnesses, he is deprived of the substance. /d. at 233. 
The court went on to conclude that "[w]hether it is 
necessary to subpoena expert witnesses in order to 
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assure a fair trial will depend upon the facts in each 
case." /d. at 234. Watson was such a case because the 
"issue of handwriting goes to the heart of the defense" 
and the expert's testimony "may have been crucial" to 
that defense. /d. 
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